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In 2018 I completed a book that I had been working on for longer than I like to recall: The Com-
munity of Advantage: A Behavioural Economist's Defence of the Market (Sugden, 2018). Its title is
taken from a passage in John Stuart Mill's Principles of Political Economy, first published in 1848.
Mill is contrasting what he sees as the enlightened economic views of his own time with the
mercantilism of the past. Mercantilism, he says, treats economic relations between countries
as if they were relations between rival tradesmen trying to undersell one another. This obsolete
way of thinking “overruled for centuries all sense of the general community of advantage which
all commercial countries derive from the prosperity of one another” (Mill, 1871, III. xxv. §1).
Mill is telling his readers that the market is a community of advantage.
By ‘advantage’, Mill clearly means that a market is a network of mutually beneficial transac-
tions. But what does he mean by ‘community’? Isn't the market simply an institutional frame-
work in which individuals pursue their respective self‐interests? Mill thinks not:- - - - - -
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Economi[C]ommerce first taught nations to see with good will the wealth and prosperity of one
another. Before, the patriot … wished all countries weak, poor, and ill‐governed, but his
own: now he sees in their wealth and progress a direct source of wealth and progress to
his own country. (1871, II. xvii. §5)His idea is that, by participating in relationships of mutual benefit, people come to see one
another as cooperative partners rather than as rivals in a zero–sum game. My book is an attempt
to express to modern readers the idea of the market as a system of voluntary cooperation that
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418 SUGDEN2 | BACKGROUND
As the subtitle of the book suggests, my stance as author is that of a behavioural economist and
an economic liberal. I am trying to counter the increasingly widespread belief that the findings
of behavioural economics justify regulatory interventions in the economy that would previously
have been thought unacceptably paternalistic. This view of the normative implications of behav-
ioural economics was expounded in two influential early papers with the significant titles ‘Lib-
ertarian Paternalism’ (Sunstein & Thaler, 2003) and ‘Regulation for Conservatives’ (Camerer,
Issacharoff, Loewenstein, O'Donoghue, & Rabin, 2003). Notice the suggestions that these papers
will provide justifications of paternalism and regulation to which libertarians and conservatives
cannot object. Colin Camerer and his co‐authors are particularly explicit about this, claiming
that by “cataloging a list of common decision‐making errors that even highly competent, well‐
functioning people make in predictable situations” (p. 1218), behavioural economics reveals
new ways in which unregulated markets might fail to promote welfare. Earlier generations of
economists proposed regulations to counter imperfect competition and imperfect information;
in the same spirit, Camerer et al. say, behavioural economists now propose paternalistic regula-
tions to counter the imperfect rationality of economic agents (p. 1218). Similarly, Cass Sunstein
and Richard Thaler (2003, p. 1162) claim that individuals are liable to make “inferior decisions
in terms of their own welfare – decisions that they would change if they had complete informa-
tion, unlimited cognitive abilities, and no lack of willpower”, and argue for “self‐conscious
efforts, by private and public institutions, to steer people's choices in directions that will improve
their own welfare”.
If one starts (as most economists have done) from the presupposition that normative econom-
ics is about how to organise an economy so that individuals' preferences are maximally satisfied,
and if one interprets behavioural economics as showing that individuals make errors in
implementing their own preferences, Camerer et al. are perhaps justified in treating such errors
as just another kind of market failure. But a liberal might still be uneasy about the suggestion
that it is part of the job of a social planner or regulator to determine what individuals' ‘true’ pref-
erences are and to use those preferences, rather than preferences revealed in individuals' actual
decisions, as the basis for normative judgements about public policy.
Some of my fellow behavioural economists think I am being contrarian in opposing paternal-
ism while contributing to a research programme that is discovering the many ways in which
individuals' decisions are inconsistent with the received theory of rational choice. But it is
important to realise that, until the early 2000s, the research programme of what is now called
behavioural economics was almost entirely empirical. It challenged the descriptive validity of
rational choice theory, but did not develop a normative theory of its own. I worked in that
research programme throughout the 1980s and 1990s, while also working as a theoretical and
philosophical economist, in what I saw as the liberal tradition of David Hume, Adam Smith,
John Stuart Mill, Friedrich Hayek, and James Buchanan. I never thought that these two aspects
of my work were in tension. A lot of my theoretical work was concerned with identifying con-
ceptual limitations of received rational choice theory and proposing alternative ways of under-
standing rationality and normative judgement. These proposals often worked by downplaying
the role of preferences.
For example, this was a time when many economists and philosophers were struggling with
the problem of how to represent the value of individual liberty within the formal framework of
social choice theory. The moral requirement that each individual should have a ‘protected
sphere’ of personal choice was construed as implying some restriction on the relationship
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tion ran into difficulties if individuals had ‘meddlesome’ preferences about one another's pri-
vate affairs. I showed that the problem dissolved if one forgot about preferences and defined
each individual's protected sphere in terms of his opportunities for choice. How each individ-
ual chose to use these opportunities was up to him, and irrelevant for the definition of liberty
(Sugden, 1985). In another contribution to social choice theory, Peter Jones and I considered
how the extent of an individual's ‘effective freedom’ might be measured. We argued that this
measure should not depend on the individual's actual preferences over the options in her
opportunity set, but instead on how well that set catered to the range of preferences that
would be reasonable or normal for someone in her position (Jones & Sugden, 1982). In a third
strand of work, I developed a theory of team reasoning in which non‐selfish behaviour does
not directly reveal altruistic or ‘social’ preferences; instead, each individual is motivated to play
his part in mutually beneficial practices, conditional on others doing the same (Sugden, 1993).
When, in 2000 or thereabouts, I set about trying to find a form of normative economics that
was compatible with behavioural findings, I built on this earlier work. Since the fundamental
problem was that individuals often seemed to lack coherent, context‐independent preferences,
my strategy was to see what could be done without using the concept of preference at all. In
place of the preference‐satisfaction criterion of traditional welfare economics, I substituted a cri-
terion of opportunity. By defining people's opportunities independently of their preferences, I
hoped to cut through the problems caused by the inadequacy of the standard assumptions of
rational choice theory. By attributing normative value to individuals' opportunities without tak-
ing any view about how those opportunities should be used, I saw myself as upholding the non‐
paternalistic traditions of liberal economics. The first finished product of this programme of
work was a paper that showed how some of the classic theoretical results of welfare economics
could be reformulated in terms of opportunity (Sugden, 2004). The underlying idea was that
competitive markets are desirable, not as an efficient means for satisfying people's given prefer-
ences, but as an institutional structure that provides opportunities for whatever voluntary trans-
actions people might want to make. In the words of Buchanan (1964, p. 219), who has been a
major influence on my work:The ‘market’ or market organization is not a means toward the accomplishment of
anything. It is, instead, the institutional embodiment of the voluntary exchange
processes that are entered into by individuals in their several capacities. That is all
there is to it.As my approach to normative analysis is very different from familiar forms of welfare eco-
nomics, I have not been surprised that it has remained a minority taste. But I was, and still
am, surprised that behavioural economists have been so ready to interpret contraventions of
rational choice theory as evidence of decision‐making error. In the pioneering era of the 1980s
and 1990s, this was exactly the interpretation of anomalies that mainstream economists typically
favoured, and that we behavioural economists disputed. (Look, for example, at the exchange
between Charles Plott, 1996 and Daniel Kahneman, 1996. Plott is suggesting that decision‐mak-
ing behaviour that contravenes rational choice theory is the result of errors which, with suffi-
cient experience, individuals learn to correct. Kahneman [1996, pp. 251–2] argues that, viewed
in the perspective of empirical psychology, Plott's distinction between “latent” rationality and
error is “deeply problematic”.) As some of us used to say, it is as if decision‐makers are held
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faulted for failing to make correct predictions. It seems to me that, in their desire to make nor-
mative pronouncements, many of my fellow behavioural economists are not taking the psycho-
logical evidence sufficiently seriously.3 | THE ARGUMENT OF THE BOOK
My book weaves together four main strands of argument.3.1 | The addressee
The first strand concerns a question that economists rarely ask explicitly: To whom should nor-
mative economics be addressed? Neoclassical and behavioural economists usually write as if
addressing an imagined ‘social planner’, implicitly conceptualised as a benevolent autocrat. Phi-
losophers who write about normative economics sometimes imagine instead that they are
engaging in ‘public reasoning’, addressing an assembly of moral agents who are trying to decide
what, all things considered, is good for people. Both approaches treat normative analysis as an
attempt to find a ‘view from nowhere’ – an impartial view of what is good for people that is not
any actual person's view of what is good for him or her.
Following Buchanan, I propose a different approach – that of contractarianism. Instead of
taking a view from nowhere, a contractarian imagines herself addressing citizens as individuals,
advising them how to reach mutually beneficial agreements. The logic of this approach disal-
lows paternalism. If you are addressing a social planner or an assembly of public reasoners,
you can coherently recommend a policy on the grounds that it promotes the welfare of certain
individuals, even though those individuals do not want it to be adopted. But the contractarian
has to show that her recommendations are in the separate interests of each individual, as that
individual perceives those interests. For a contractarian, what is wrong with paternalism is not
that it has morally objectionable properties, as viewed from nowhere. It is that a paternalistic
proposal is not properly addressed. If you want to prevent someone from making a choice that
you think would be bad for her, the person you need to address is her, not someone who has
assumed the role of a self‐appointed guardian.3.2 | Behavioural welfare economics and paternalism
The second strand is a critique of ‘behavioural welfare economics’ – the approach to normative
analysis that was proposed by Camerer et al. (2003) and Sunstein and Thaler (2003), and which
is now favoured by most behavioural economists. This critique originated in a paper I wrote
jointly with Gerardo Infante and Guilhem Lecouteux (Infante, Lecouteux, & Sugden, 2016).
Behavioural welfare economics implicitly assumes that people have context‐independent ‘true’
or ‘latent’ preferences which, because of psychologically induced errors, are not always revealed
in actual choices. It aims to reconstruct latent preferences by identifying and removing the
effects of error on decisions, and to design policies to satisfy those preferences. Its implicit model
of human agency is of an ‘inner rational agent’ that interacts with the world through an imper-
fect psychological ‘shell’. I argue that there is no satisfactory evidence to support this model, and
no credible psychological foundation for it. If the concept of true preference has no empirical
content, the idea that such preferences can be reconstructed is a mirage.
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The third strand of the book proposes an alternative form of normative economics that does not
use the concept of preference. I begin by looking for a normative criterion that citizens might
reasonably want economists to use when making recommendations about public policy. As a
first step, I propose the Individual Opportunity Criterion – the principle that, as viewed by each
citizen separately, more opportunity for that person is better than less. When an individual
makes choices over time, ‘more opportunity’ includes opportunities for her to change her mind
from one period to another. I argue that each citizen can endorse this criterion without needing
to believe that her own preferences are rationally consistent.
However, it is intrinsic to the idea of a market that the set of opportunities available to any
one person depends on the choices that other people make from their opportunity sets. Thus,
what each person can expect to gain from participating in the market cannot be described by
any particular opportunity set, specified independently of other people's choices. What people
collectively can expect from the market is a rich array of opportunities to trade with each
other on terms that they might find mutually acceptable. Building on Sugden (2004) and on
work I have done with Ben McQuillin (McQuillin & Sugden, 2012), I propose an Interactive
Opportunity Criterion which (roughly speaking) says that individuals collectively should have
as much opportunity as possible to carry out whatever voluntary transactions they might want
to make. (‘Might’ here ranges over the entire range of preferences that a person might plau-
sibly have: there is no reference to actual preferences.) I show that this criterion is satisfied in
the equilibrium state of a competitive market, also defined without reference to preferences.
This result is encapsulated in one of my favourite slogans. Let us say that a person is willing
to pay for a good if he is willing to give up what would induce others (or, if he is liable to
change his mind, himself at another point in time) to supply it. Then to say that the Interac-
tive Opportunity Criterion is satisfied is to say that each person is able to get whatever he
wants and is willing to pay for, when he wants it and is willing to pay for it.
Recognising that this is a result about a highly idealised economy, I consider a range of con-
ditions that are usually considered as ‘market failures’ to be corrected by governmental regula-
tion. I discuss these conditions, and possible responses to them, from a contractarian viewpoint.
I argue that neoclassical arguments for regulations against cartels and against the exploitation of
monopoly power can be endorsed on contractarian grounds, as can certain kinds of regulations
against spurious complexity in pricing. But I raise doubts about the significance of behavioural
arguments for regulation that assume choice overload or preferences for self‐constraint.
Finally, I ask what properties a market economy must have if it is to be psychologically stable
– that is, if it is to reproduce a general belief that its governing principles are fair. I argue that,
because of the division of knowledge and because the opportunities open to each person depend
on how other people choose to use their opportunities, markets cannot guarantee that individ-
uals are rewarded according to the efforts they make, or according to the talents they put to
use. Here I follow Hayek (1976, p. 94), who recognises that “in the cosmos of the market we
all constantly receive benefits which we have not deserved in any moral sense”. Psychological
stability has to rest on continuing expectations of mutual benefit, defined relative to a baseline
that evolves over time and that cannot be justified in terms of abstract principles of fairness.
Nevertheless, if the market is to be recommended to each individual separately, each individual
must be able to expect to share in the benefits that markets create. Maintaining such expecta-
tions typically requires some form of social insurance, but if markets are to work, there cannot
be full insurance against underserved losses.
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The final strand of the book considers the moral status of markets. Virtue ethicists such as Eliz-
abeth Anderson (1993) and Michael Sandel (2012) have argued that there are ‘moral limits’ to
the proper domain of the market: market relations (it is said) are based on self‐interested and
instrumental motivations, and are thereby morally impoverished. A related idea in economics
is that socially valuable practices (particularly those of trust and reciprocity) can depend on
pro‐social and intrinsic motivations which the market tends to ‘crowd out’. An important strand
of behavioural economics is concerned with modelling intrinsic motivation, ‘social preferences’,
and preferences for conforming to social norms. Building on work I have done with Luigino
Bruni (Bruni & Sugden, 2013) and Andrea Isoni (Isoni & Sugden, 2019), I argue that market
relations can be viewed by those who participate in them as cooperative: each party can act with
the intention that the parties together achieve mutual benefit. Such an intention is neither self‐
interested nor altruistic.
To explain this kind of intention, I develop a version of the theory of team reasoning that
uses opportunity‐based rather than preference‐based concepts and makes minimal assump-
tions about people's rationality. The essential idea is encapsulated in a moral rule or norm,
the Principle of Mutual Benefit. This requires that when you are participating with others in
an interaction that each of you has chosen to enter, and for as long as the other participants
follow the principle too, you should behave in such a way that the other participants are able
to satisfy normal expectations about the consequences of the interaction for them. In a popu-
lation of people who act on the principle, those actions tend to reproduce social practices (for
example, practices of honest trading) that provide opportunities for mutual benefit. In contrast
to the implications of many social‐preference theories in which reciprocity is treated as
returning kindness for kindness, the hypothesis that people act on the Principle of Mutual
Benefit does not lead to the ‘Paradox of Trust’ – the paradoxical conclusion that if everyone
were completely trustworthy, trust would not reveal pro‐social intentions, and so could not
prompt trustworthiness.
In the final chapter of the book, I argue (in what I take to be the spirit of John Rawls's 1971
account of justice) that a contractarian can recommend to individuals that, consulting only their
own interests, they agree that some principle of behaviour is to count as moral – that each will
use her best endeavours to conform to it, to support others in conforming to it, and to censure
others if they fail to conform. I end with a contractarian recommendation to my fellow‐citizens:
that it is their common interest to accept the Principle of Mutual Benefit.ACKNOWLEDGEMENT
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